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Capital Markets Commentary - March 2025

We're not going to lie. Conjuring topics for this month's letter has been tough. Should we talk about tariffs? Well, we don't know any more about tariffs than we knew last month. Interest rates? It's hard to formulate an outlook on rates until we get more clarity on tariffs. Earnings? Until we understand where rates might go and where tariffs might land, we can't really get much of a grasp on the outlook for earnings, either. So what can we do? We can look to history for a guide. It wasn't that long ago, 2018 and 2019, that we found ourselves in a similar position so this month, we'll take a trip down memory lane and review what's similar this go-round, and what's different, but first, let's look at the numbers for February.


A rally on the last trading day wasn't enough to pull US indices out of losing territory for the month. The techheavy NASDAQ took the brunt of the selling, closing February in the red by 3.9% with the S&P 500 and Dow down 1.3% and 1.4% respectively. Europe, on the other hand, closed wholly to the good with the German DAX, UK FTSE, and the Eurozone STOXX 50 all up in excess of 3%. Asia turned in mixed results with Japan's Nikkei 225 losing 3.3% while Hong Kong's Hang Seng gained a whopping 13.6%.ⁱ Bonds, as measured by the US ten-year Treasury, gained in price and lost yield. The benchmark bond closed January at a yield of 4.57% then ran up a bit in early February, only to drift steadily lower going into month's end. By the time trading closed on the 28th, the yield had dropped all the way down to 4.23%,ⁱⁱ perhaps reflecting jitters over what tariffs might mean for growth. So, with the housekeeping out of the way, let's dive in.

The proposed 25% tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada were postponed. Then, as we were going "to press" with this letter, the administration announced these tariffs will indeed go live on March 4th. Nonetheless, as of this writing, the only new tariff actually implemented thus far is the 10% levy on all imports from China. A 25% tariff on steel and aluminum is *scheduled* to go into effect on March 12th. Since China is thus far the only country actually paying new tariffs, let's start there.ⁱⁱⁱ In 2023, the US imported around \$427 billion in goods.^{iv} Let's assume that the value of 2025 imports would be roughly the same. If that's the case, then the tariff would generate around \$42.7 billion in revenue, an unknown portion of which is likely to be passed along to the consumer. The 1st Trump administration imposed similar tariffs on what was then \$380 billion in Chinese imports, and these tariffs were largely kept in place by the subsequent Biden administration.^v


China retaliated, of course, hitting US exports to China like soybeans, sorghum, medical equipment, and agricultural machinery. Between mid-2018 and the end of 2019, US agricultural exports to China dropped by 76% which in turn prompted the US to backstop American farmers to the tune of \$28 billion.^{vi} The point is that trade wars can have tentacles. We hit them then they hit us. Governments do pick up revenue, but then sometimes have to pay that


revenue back out in order to shore up affected industries. At least a portion of the levy is almost always passed along to the consumer. This is not to say that tariffs won't have their desired effect - they may well be a riotous success – but even in victory, they can be costly. We also acknowledge that many will not unreasonably deem those costs to be justified if they ultimately lead to increased US manufacturing output. It's just impossible to know how costly, and who will pay that cost, until the things are actually in place.

So, we don't yet know what new tariffs will cost the economy, if anything, but let's look at what impact they may have had last go around. This also isn't easy math as taxes are not included in the Producer Price Index and tariffs are considered to be a tax. Nonetheless, research conducted by Mary Amiti of the New York Fed in 2019^{vii} and Pablo Fajgelbaum, PhD of UCLA in 2022 suggests that producer prices increased by the amount of the tariffs within months. In other words, tariffs were ultimately passed along to the consumer in their entirety.^{viii}



Prices rose, but did US manufacturers add workers? The US has been in the tariff business since the Tariff Act of 1789 was signed by George Washington on July 31st of that year, so this situation is far from novel. That first tariff was levied to, among other things, support the development of American manufacturing, and this has usually been the purported rationale behind most tariffs since. Did it work? Two charts below illustrate tariffs collected by the US since 1948 and US manufacturing employment since 1948. These charts should not suggest to you that tariffs have utterly failed in that mission. We just cannot know with any precision the extent to which tariffs have helped us retain some jobs that may have been otherwise lost to automation and offshoring.






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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics via FRED® Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions.



Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

In 2018, prices shocked to the upside, but leveled off fairly quickly and do not seem to have contributed meaningfully to inflation. That's not to say there weren't impacts. An auto manufacturer, for example, shuttered factories in Ohio, Maryland and Michigan citing steel tariffs as a cause^{ix}, and it's a similar impact we need to consider this time around. The American Automobile Labeling Act of 1994 restricts the definition of an "American Made" vehicle to one that has 55% or more of it's components originating in the US or Canada. Ergo, as much as 44% of an "American Made" car is assembled using foreign parts.^x The same can be said of many widgets otherwise advertised as domestic.

Long story short: We can expect tariffs to goose inflation, which is one reason why we expect the Federal Reserve to delay additional cuts to the Fed funds rate at least until June and perhaps for the balance of the year. If tariffs are short and targeted, we would expect the pick-up in inflation to also be brief, with minimal impacts to the consumer. Longer tariffs more broadly applied could incrementally change that calculus. We just don't know which way its going to go. As Fed Chair Jay Powell opined in comments following the Fed's December meeting:

"It's kind of common sense thinking that when the path is uncertain, you go a little bit slower. It's not unlike driving on a foggy night or walking into a dark room full of furniture; you just slow down." Jerome Powell, December 18, 2024 Let's say that tariffs do succeed in forcing domestic manufacturers to repatriate jobs to the US. The American manufacturing worker is the highest paid in the world, earning on average \$28.50 per hour. The same worker in South Korea earns the equivalent of \$9.08 per hour.^{xi} The more American made stuff that goes into a product, the more it will cost. Morgan Stanley estimates that inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Index (PCE) will increase by 0.6% and that overall inflation will increase as much as 1.1% putting the Fed's 2% target further out of reach. The firm also estimates that consumer spending will contract by as much as 2%. Larry Kudlow, the director of the National Economic Council during the first Trump term, was quoted as saying, "At least for now, the economic signals are flashing slower growth and higher inflation. Not good."

In economics, Newton's 3rd law of physics also applies: For every action there's an equal and opposite reaction. Lower interest rates, for example, mean that more Americans may be able to afford a mortgage loan. On the other hand, cheap mortgage rates can also drive up the price of housing thus making homes unaffordable regardless of the interest rate charged. In the same vein, increasing the percentage of goods that qualify as "made in America" can employ more Americans, but can also greatly increase the cost of those goods for other Americans. It isn't always a win-win.

Our base case, perhaps overly hopeful, is that tariffs will ultimately be targeted and of brief duration as the alternative, broad and long, would seem to be both politically and economically inexpedient. Nonetheless, the best advice we have is to hope for the best, but plan for the worst. Assess your tolerance for risk and talk to us about whether or not your positioning accurately reflects that tolerance. If that means leaving some upside on the table in the event that tariffs are a non-event, it seems to us a reasonable price to pay.

As always, should you have specific questions or concerns, we hope you'll never hesitate to ask. We always look forward to hearing from you.




Exhibit 11: While the pass-through of tariffs into the inflation rate of core goods CPI was relatively small, the sectoral effects were more persistent.

Source: BLS, Morgan Stanley Research

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viii Source: "The Economic Impacts of the US-China Trade War," with Amit Khandelwal. Annual Review of Economics, vol. 14 (2022).

ix Source: nytimes.com/2018/11/26/business/general-motors-cutbacks.html

^x Source: eCFR.gov Part 583, Automobile Parts Content Labeling

ⁱ Source: Blomberg, FactSet, Morgan Stanley Wealth Management GIO

ⁱⁱ Source: Thompson Reuters

ⁱⁱⁱ Source: US Trade Representative, ustr.gov

^{iv} Source: US Census Bureau - <u>https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html</u>

^v Source: https://taxfoundation.org

vi Source: USDA, Agricultural Exports and Retaliatory Trade Actions, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy 2021

vii Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

xi Source: https://tradingeconomics.com>southkorea